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a b s t r a c t
It was realized early on that topologies can model constructive systems, as the open sets
form a Heyting algebra. After the development of forcing, in the form of Boolean-valued
models, it became clear that, just as over ZF any Boolean-valued model also satisfies
ZF, Heyting-valued models satisfy IZF, which stands for Intuitionistic ZF, the most direct
constructive re-working of the ZF axioms. In this paper, we return to topologies, and
introduce a variant model, along with a correspondingly revised forcing or satisfaction
relation. The purpose is to prove independence results related to weakenings of the Power
Set axiom. The originalmotivation is the secondmodel of [9], based onR, which shows that
Exponentiation, in the context of CZFminus Subset Collection, does not suffice to prove that
the Dedekind reals form a set. The current semantics is the generalization of that model
from R to an arbitrary topological space. It is investigated which set-theoretic principles
hold in suchmodels in general. In addition, natural properties of the underlying topological
space are shown to imply the validity of stronger such principles.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Topological interpretations of constructive systems were first studied by Stone [15] and Tarski [16], who independently
provided such for propositional logic. This was later extended by Mostowski [12] to predicate logic. The first application
of this to any sort of higher-order system was Scott’s interpretation of analysis [13,14]. Grayson [6,7] then generalized the
latter to the whole set-theoretic universe, to provide a model of IZF, Intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory. Although
not directly relevant to our concerns, it was soon realized that topological semantics could be unified with Kripke and
Beth models, and all generalized, via categorical semantics; see [5] and [10] for good introductions. Here is introduced,
not a generalized, but rather an alternative semantics. (Incidentally, this semantics can also be understood categorically, as
determined by Streicher (unpublished).)
An instance of this semantics was already applied in [9] to the reals R. The context there was CZF, Constructive ZF,
introduced in [1–3] and exposited in [4]. CZF is currently the most studied system of constructive set theory, because of
the modesty of its proof-theoretic strength coupled with its implicational power. For instance, even though CZF does not
have the proof-theoretically very strong Power Set Axiom, its substitute, Aczel’s Subset Collection, suffices to prove that
the Dedekind reals form a set. What was not clear was whether a further weakening of Power Set from Subset Collection
to Exponentiation, or the existence of function spaces, would also prove the same. In the context of the other CZF axioms,
Subset Collection and Exponentiation are proof-theoretically equivalent, so proof-theoretic analyses would not be able to
answer this question. In contrast, one of the models of [9] satisfies CZFExp, yet the Dedekind cuts do not form a set, thereby
showing the necessity of Subset Collection, or at least of something more than Exponentiation.
The essence of the construction there is that, as in a traditional topological model, the truth value of set membership
(σ ∈ τ , where σ and τ are terms) is an open set of R, but at any moment the terms under consideration can collapse to
groundmodel terms. (A groundmodel term is the canonical image of a groundmodel set - think of the standard embedding
of V into V[G] in classical forcing.) Such a collapse does not make the variable sets disappear, though. So no set could be
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the Dedekind cuts: any such candidate could at any time collapse to a ground model set, but then it wouldn’t contain the
canonical generic because that’s a variable set, and this generic, over R, is a Dedekind cut.1
This process of collapsing to a groundmodel setwe call settling down. Our purpose is to showhow this settling semantics
works in an arbitrary topological space, not just R. This extension is not completely straightforward. Certain uniformities of
R allowed for simplifications in the definition of forcing () and for proofs of stronger set-theoretic axioms,most notably Full
Separation and Exponentiation. In the next section, we prove as much as we can making no assumptions on the topological
space T being worked over; in the following section, natural and appropriately modest assumptions are made on T so that
Separation and Exponentiation can be proven.
The greatest weakness in what can be proven in the general case is in the family of Power Set-like axioms. This is no
surprise, as the semantics was developed for a purpose which necessitated the failure of Subset Collection (and hence of
Power Set itself). That Exponentiation ended up holding is thanks to the particularities ofR, not to settling semantics. Rather,
what does hold in general is a weakened version of all of these Power Set-like axioms. The reason that Power Set fails, like
the non-existence of the set of Dedekind cuts above, is that any candidate for the power set of X might collapse to a ground
model set, and so would then no longer contain any variable subset of X . However, that variable subset might itself collapse,
and then would be in the classical power set of X . So while the subset in question, before the collapse, might not equal a
member of the classical power set, it cannot be different from every suchmember. That is the form of Power Set which holds
in the settling semantics:
Eventual Power Set: ∀X ∃C (∀Y ∈ C Y ⊆ X) ∧ (∀Y ⊆ X ¬∀Z ∈ C Y ≠ Z).
Althoughwewill not need them, there are comparableweakenings of Subset Collection (or Fullness) and Exponentiation:
Eventual Fullness: ∀X, Y ∃C (∀Z ∈ C Z is a total relation from X to Y ) ∧ (∀R if R is a total relation from X to Y then
¬∀Z ∈ C Z ⊈ R).
Eventual Exponentiation: ∀X, Y ∃C ∀F if F is a total function from X to Y then ¬∀Z ∈ C F ≠ Z .
It is easy to see that Power Set implies Fullness, which itself implies Exponentiation. Essentially the same arguments will
prove:
Proposition 1.1. Eventual Power Set implies Eventual Fullness, which in turn implies Eventual Exponentiation.
As already stated, the originalmotivation of this workwas to generalize an extant construction from one to all topologies.
Now that it is done, other uses can be imagined. The theory identified here is incomparable with CZF, so its proof-theoretic
strength is unclear. If it turns out to be weak, perhaps it could be combined with CZF to provide a slight strengthening of the
latter while maintaining a similar proof theory. In any case, the model-theoretic construction might be useful for further
independence results, the purpose of the first,motivatingmodel. A long-termproject is some kind of classification ofmodels,
topological or otherwise; having this unconventional example might help find other yet-to-be-discovered constructions. A
question raised by van den Berg is how themodel would have to be expanded in order to get amodel of IZF. He observed that
the recursive realizability model based on (definable subsets of) the natural numbers [8] (also discovered independently by
Streicher in unpublished work), which satisfies CZF + Full Separation (and necessarily not Power Set), is essentially just the
collection of subcountable sets from the full recursive realizability model [11], and hence is naturally extendable to an IZF
model. It is at best unclear how the current model could be so extended. Somewhat speculatively, applications to computer
science are also conceivable, wherever such modeling might be natural. For instance, constructive logic can naturally be
used to model computation when objects are viewed as having properties only partially determined at any stage; if in
addition parallel computation is part of the programming paradigm, it could be that a variable is passed to several parallel
sub-computations, which specify the variable more and in incompatible ways. This is similar to the current construction,
where there are two transition functions, both leading to the same future but under one function the variable/generic is
fully specified and under the other it’s not.
2. The general case
First we define the term structure of the topological model with settling, then truth in themodel (the forcing semantics),
and then we prove that the model satisfies some standard set-theoretic axioms.
Definition 2.1. For a topological space T , a term is a set of the form {⟨σi, Ji⟩ | i ∈ I} ∪ {⟨σh, rh⟩ | h ∈ H}, where each σ is
(inductively) a term, each J an open set, each r is a member of T , and H and I index sets.
The first part of each term is as usual. It suffices for the embedding x → xˆ of the groundmodel into the topologicalmodel:
Definition 2.2. xˆ = {⟨yˆ, T ⟩ | y ∈ x}. Any term of the form xˆ is called a ground model term.
For φ a formula in the language of set theory with (set, not term) parameters x0, x1, . . . , xn, then φˆ is the formula in the
term language obtained from φ by replacing each xi with xˆi.
ˇis the inverse of ˆ , for both sets/terms and formulas: ˆˇτ = τ , ˇˆx = x, ˆˇφ = φ, and ˇˆφ = φ.
1 For those already familiarwith a similar-sounding construction by Joyal, this is exactlywhat distinguishes the two. Joyal startedwith a topological space
T , and took the union of T with a second copy of T , the latter carrying the discrete topology (i.e. every subset is open). So by Joyal, you could specialize at a
point, but then every set is also specialized there. Here, you can specialize every set you’re looking at at a point, but that won’t make the ambient variable
sets disappear. Alternatively, the whole universe will specialize, but at the same time be reborn. For an exposition of Joyal’s argument in print, see either
[7] or [17] p. 805–807.
822 R.S. Lubarsky / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 820–830
The second part of the definition of a term plays a role only when we decide to have the term settle down and stop
changing. This settling down is described as follows.
Definition 2.3. For a term σ and r ∈ T , σ r is defined inductively on the terms as {⟨σ ri , T ⟩ | ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ ∧ r ∈ Ji} ∪ {⟨σ rh , T ⟩ |⟨σh, r⟩ ∈ σ }.
Note that σ r is a ground model term. It bears observation that (σ r)s = σ r .
Definition 2.4. For φ = φ(σ0, . . . , σi) a formula with parameters σ0, . . . , σi, φr is φ(σ r0 , . . . , σ ri ).
We define a forcing relation J  φ, with J an open subset of T and φ a formula.
Definition 2.5. J  φ is defined inductively on φ:
J  σ = τ iff for all ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ and vice versa, and for all r ∈ J σ r = τ r
J  σ ∈ τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a ⟨τi, Ji⟩ ∈ τ and Jr ⊆ Ji containing r such that Jr  σ = τi
J  φ ∧ ψ iff J  φ and J  ψ
J  φ ∨ ψ iff for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that Jr  φ or Jr  ψ
J  φ → ψ iff for all J ′ ⊆ J if J ′  φ then J ′  ψ , and, for all r ∈ J , there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that, for all K ⊆ Jr , if
K  φr then K  ψ r
J  ∃x φ(x) iff for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r and a σ such that Jr  φ(σ)
J  ∀x φ(x) iff for all σ J  φ(σ), and for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that for all σ Jr  φr(σ ).
(Notice that in the last clause, σ is not interpreted as σ r .)
Lemma 2.6.  is sound for constructive logic.
Lemma 2.7. T forces the equality axioms, to wit:
1. ∀x x = x
2. ∀x, y x = y → y = x
3. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ y = z → x = z
4. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ x ∈ z → y ∈ z
5. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ z ∈ x → z ∈ y.
Proof. 1: It is trivial to show via a simultaneous induction that, for all J and σ , J  σ = σ , and, for all ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ , J ∩ Ji 
σi ∈ σ .
2: Trivial because the definition of J  σ =M τ is itself symmetric.
3: For this and the subsequent parts, we need a lemma.
Lemma 2.8. If J ′ ⊆ J  σ = τ then J ′  σ = τ , and similarly for ∈.
Proof. By induction on σ and τ . 
Returning to the main lemma, we show that if J  ρ = σ and J  σ = τ then J  ρ = τ , which suffices. This will be
done by induction on terms for all opens J simultaneously.
For the second clause in J  ρ = τ , let r ∈ J . By the hypotheses, second clauses, ρr = σ r and σ r = τ r , so ρr = τ r .
The first clause of the definition of forcing equality follows by induction on terms. Starting with ⟨ρi, Ji⟩ ∈ ρ, we need to
show that J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ τ . We have J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ σ . For a fixed, arbitrary r ∈ J ∩ Ji let ⟨σj, Jj⟩ ∈ σ and J ′ ⊆ J ∩ Ji be such that
r ∈ J ′ ∩ Jj  ρi = σj. By hypothesis, J ∩ Jj  σj ∈ τ . So let ⟨τk, Jk⟩ ∈ τ and Jˆ ⊆ J ∩ Jj be such that r ∈ Jˆ ∩ Jk  σj = τk. Let J˜ be
J ′∩ Jˆ ∩ Jj. Note that J˜ ⊆ J ∩ Ji, and that r ∈ J˜ ∩ Jk. We want to show that J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi = τk. Observing that J˜ ∩ Jk ⊆ J ′∩ Jj, Jˆ ∩ Jk, it
follows by the previous lemma that J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi = σj, σj =M τk, from which the desired conclusion follows by the induction.
So r ∈ J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi ∈ τ . Since r ∈ J ∩ Ji was arbitrary, J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ τ .
4: It suffices to show that if J  ρ = σ and J  ρ ∈ τ then J  σ ∈ τ . Let r ∈ J . By hypothesis, let ⟨τi, Ji⟩ ∈ τ , Jr ⊆ Ji be
such that r ∈ Jr  ρ = τi; without loss of generality Jr ⊆ J . By the previous lemma, Jr  ρ = σ , and by the previous part of
the current lemma, Jr  σ = τi. Hence Jr  σ ∈ τ . Since r ∈ J was arbitrary, we are done.
5: Similar, and left to the reader. 
Lemma 2.9. 1. For all φ ∅  φ.
2. If J ′ ⊆ J  φ then J ′  φ.
3. If Ji  φ for all i then

i Ji  φ.
4. J  φ iff for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that Jr  φ.
5. For all φ, J if J  φ then for all r ∈ J there is a neighborhood Jr of r such that Jr  φr .
6. For φ bounded (i.e.∆0) and having only ground model terms as parameters, T  φ iff φˇ (i.e. V |= φˇ).
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Proof. 1. Trivial induction. This part is not used later, and is mentioned here only to flesh out the picture.
2. Again, a trivial induction. The base cases,= and ∈, are proven by induction on terms, as mentioned just above.
3. By induction. For the case of→, you need to invoke the previous part of this lemma. All other cases are straightforward.
4. Trivial, using 3.
5. By induction on φ.
=: If r ∈ J  σ = τ then σ r = τ r . By the proof of the first part of the equality lemma, T  σ r = τ r .
∈: If r ∈ J  σ ∈ τ , let τi, Ji, and Jr be as given by the definition of forcing ∈. Inductively, some neighborhood of r (or, by
the previous case, T itself) forces σ r = τ ri . Since ⟨τ ri , T ⟩ ∈ τ r , T  τ ri ∈ τ r , and T  σ r ∈ τ r .∨: If r ∈ J  φ ∨ ψ , suppose without loss of generality that r ∈ Jr  φ. Inductively let Kr be a neighborhood of r forcing
φr . Then Kr  φr ∨ ψ r .
∧: If r ∈ J  φ ∧ ψ , let Jr and Kr be neighborhoods of r such that Jr  φ and Kr  ψ . Then Jr ∩ Kr is as desired.
→: If r ∈ J  φ → ψ , then Jr as given in the definition of forcing→ suffices. (To verify the second clause in the definition
of Jr  φr → ψ r , use the fact that (φr)s = φ and (ψ r)s = ψ .)
∃: If r ∈ J  ∃x φ(x), let Jr ⊆ J and σ be such that r ∈ Jr  φ(σ). By induction, let Kr be such that r ∈ Kr  φr(σ r). So
Kr  ∃x φr(x).
∀: If r ∈ J  ∀x φ(x), then Jr as given by the definition of forcing ∀ suffices.
6. A simple induction. 
At this point, we are ready to show what is in general forced under this semantics.
Theorem 2.10. T forces:
Infinity
Pairing
Union
Extensionality
Set Induction
Eventual Power Set
Bounded (∆0) Separation
Collection
Some comments on this choice of axioms are in order. The first five are unremarkable. The role of Eventual Power Set
was discussed in the Introduction. The restriction of Separation to the∆0 case should be familiar, as that is also the case in
CZF and KP. By way of compensation, the version of Collection in CZF is Strong Collection: not only does every total relation
with domain a set have a bounding set (regular Collection), but that bounding set can be chosen so that it contains only
elements related to something in the domain (the strong version). In the presence of full Separation, these are equivalent, as
an appropriate subset of any bounding set can always be taken. Unfortunately, even the additional hypotheses provided by
Collection are not enough in the current context to yield even this modest fragment of Separation, as will actually be shown
at the beginning of the next section. In fact, even Replacement fails, as we will see.
Proof.
– Infinity: ωˆ will do. (Recall that the canonical name xˆ of any set x from the ground model is defined inductively as
{⟨yˆ, T ⟩ | y ∈ x}.)
– Pairing: Given σ and τ , {⟨σ , T ⟩, ⟨τ , T ⟩}will do.
– Union: Given σ , the union of the following four terms will do:
– {⟨τ , J ∩ Ji⟩ | for some σi, ⟨τ , J⟩ ∈ σi and ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ }
– {⟨τ , r⟩ | for some σi, ⟨τ , r⟩ ∈ σi and ⟨σi, r⟩ ∈ σ }
– {⟨τ , r⟩ | for some σi and K , ⟨τ , K⟩ ∈ σi, r ∈ K , and ⟨σi, r⟩ ∈ σ }
– {⟨τ , r⟩ | for some σi and K , ⟨τ , r⟩ ∈ σi, r ∈ K , and ⟨σi, K⟩ ∈ σ }.
– Extensionality: We need to show that
T  ∀x ∀y [∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y]. (1)
It suffices to show that for any terms σ and τ ,
T  ∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ)→ σ = τ . (2)
(Although that is only the first clause in forcing ∀, it subsumes the second, because σ and τ could have been chosen as
ground model terms in the first place.) To show that, for the second clause in forcing→, it suffices to show that
T  ∀z (z ∈ σ r ↔ z ∈ τ r)→ σ r = τ r . (3)
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But, as before, this is already subsumed by choosing σ and τ to be ground model terms in the first place. Hence it suffices
to check the first clause in forcing→:
∀J[J  ∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ)] → [J  σ = τ ]. (4)
To this end, let ⟨σi, Ji⟩ be in σ ; we need to show that J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ . By the choice of J , J  σi ∈ σ ↔ σi ∈ τ . In
particular, J  σi ∈ σ → σi ∈ τ . By 2.9, part 2), J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ σ → σi ∈ τ . Since J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ σ (proof of 2.7, part 1)),
J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ . Symmetrically for ⟨τi, Ji⟩ ∈ τ .
Also, let r ∈ J . If σ r ≠ τ r , let ⟨ρ, T ⟩ be in their symmetric difference. By the choice of J , for some neighborhood Jr of r ,
Jr  ρ ∈ σ r ↔ ρ ∈ τ r . This contradicts the choice of ρ. So σ r = τ r .
– Set Induction (Schema): We need to show that
T  ∀x ((∀y ∈ x φ(y))→ φ(x))→ ∀x φ(x). (5)
The statement in question is an implication. The definition of forcing→ contains two clauses.
The first clause is that, for any open set J and formula φ, if J  ∀x(∀y ∈ x φ(y) → φ(x)) then J  ∀x φ(x). By way of
proving that, suppose not. Let J and φ provide a counter-example. By hypothesis,
∀σ J  ∀y ∈ σ φ(y)→ φ(σ) (6)
and
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀σ ′ J ′  ∀y ∈ σ ′ φr(y)→ φr(σ ′). (7)
Since J ̸ ∀xφ(x), either
∃σ J ̸ φ(σ) (8)
or
∃r ∈ J ∀J ′ ∋ r ∃σ ′ J ′ ̸ φr(σ ′). (9)
If (9) holds, let r as given by (9), and then let J ′ be as given by (7) for that r . By (9), ∃σ ′ J ′ ̸ φr(σ ′); let σ be such a σ ′ – so
J ′ ̸ φr(σ ) – of minimal V-rank. By (7), we have J ′  ∀y ∈ σ φr(y)→ φr(σ ). If we can show that J ′  ∀y ∈ σ φr(y), then
(by the definition of forcing→) we will have a contradiction, showing that (9) must fail.
To that end, we must show, unpacking the abbreviation, that J ′  ∀y(y ∈ σ → φr(y)); that is,
∀τ J ′  τ ∈ σ → φr(τ ) (10)
and
∀s ∈ J ′ ∃K ∋ s ∀τ K  τ ∈ σ s → φr(τ ), (11)
the latter because (φr)s = φr .
By way of showing (10), suppose J ′ ⊇ K  τ ∈ σ . Then K can be covered with open sets Ki such that Ki  τ = σi and
Ki ⊆ Ji where ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ . Since σi has strictly lower V-rank than σ , J ′  φr(σi). Hence Ki  φr(τ ). Since the Kis cover K
(by Lemma 2.9, part 3)) K forces the same. We still have to show that for all s ∈ J ′ there is a K ∋ s such that for all K ′ ⊆ K
if K ′  τ s ∈ σ s then K ′  φr(τ s). In fact, J ′ suffices for K : if J ′ ⊇ K ′  τ s ∈ σ s then K ′  φr(τ s). Moreover, this is the
same argument as the one just completed, with σ s in place of σ . The only minor observation that bears making is that
the V-rank of σ s is less than or equal to that of σ , so again when τ is forced to be a member of σ s its V-rank is strictly less
than that of σ , so the choice of σ carries us through.
To show (11), we claim that J ′ suffices for the choice of K : J ′  τ ∈ σ s → φr(τ ). Once more, this is just (10), with σ s
in place of σ .
This completes the proof that (9) must fail. Hence we have that the negation of (9) must hold, namely
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀σ ′ J ′  φr(σ ′), (12)
as well as (8). Let σ be of minimal V-rank such that J ̸ φ(σ). If we can show that J  ∀y ∈ σ φ(y), then by (6) we will
have a contradiction, completing the proof of the first clause.
What we need to show are
∀τ J  τ ∈ σ → φ(τ) (13)
and
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀τ J ′  τ ∈ σ r → φr(τ ). (14)
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By way of showing (13), suppose J ⊇ K  τ ∈ σ ; we need to show that K  φ(τ). This is the same argument, based on
the minimality of σ , as in the proof of (10). The other part of showing (13) is
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀K ⊆ J ′ (K  τ r ∈ σ r ⇒ K  φr(τ r)). (15)
Both (14) and (15) are special cases of (12).
This completes the proof of the first clause.
The second clause is that for all r ∈ T there is a J ∋ r such that for all K ⊆ J if K  ∀x ((∀y ∈ x φr(y))→ φr(x)) then
K  ∀x φr(x). For any r , let J be T . Then what remains of the claim has exactly the same form as the first clause, with K
and φr for J and φ respectively. Since the validity of this first clause was already shown for all choices of J and φ, we are
done.
– Eventual Power Set: We need to show that
T  ∀X ∃C ∀Y (Y ⊆ X → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ C → Y ≠ Z)). (16)
(Actually, we must also produce a C that contains only subsets of X . However, to extract such a sub-collection from any
C as above is an instance of Bounded Separation, the proof of which below does not rely on the current proof. So we will
make our lives a little easier and prove the version of EPS as stated.) Since the sentence forced has no parameters, the
second clause in forcing ∀ is subsumed by the first, so all we must show is that, for any term σ ,
T  ∃C ∀Y (Y ⊆ σ → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ C → Y ≠ Z)). (17)
Let τ = {⟨xˆ, r⟩ | σ r = sˆ ∧ x ⊆ s}. This is the desired C . It suffices to show that
T  ∀Y (Y ⊆ σ → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ → Y ≠ Z)). (18)
For the first clause in forcing ∀, we need to show that
T  ρ ⊆ σ → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ → ρ ≠ Z). (19)
To do that, first suppose T ⊇ J  ρ ⊆ σ . (Note that that implies that for all s ∈ J T  ρs ⊆ σ s, so that ⟨ρs, s⟩ ∈ τ , and
T  ρs ∈ τ s.) We must show that
J  ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ → ρ ≠ Z). (20)
It suffices to show that no non-empty subset K of J forces
∀Z(Z ∈ τ → ρ ≠ Z) (21)
or
∀Z(Z ∈ τ r → ρr ≠ Z) (22)
(r ∈ J). For the former, we will show that K must violate the second clause in forcing ∀. Let s ∈ K . Letting Z be ρs, as just
observed, all of T will force Z ∈ τ s but nothing will force ρs ≠ Z . Similarly for the latter, by choosing Z to be ρr . To finish
forcing the implication, it suffices to show that for all r
T  ρr ⊆ σ r → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ r → ρr ≠ Z). (23)
Again, it suffices to let Z be ρr .
For the second clause in forcing ∀, for r ∈ T and ρ a term, it suffices to show that
T  ρ ⊆ σ r → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ r → ρ ≠ Z). (24)
This time letting Z by any ρs suffices.
– Bounded Separation: The important point here is that, for φ bounded (∆0) with only ground model terms, J  φ iff T  φ
iff V |= φˇ (2.9, part 6).
We need to show that
T  ∀X ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ X ∧ φ(Z)). (25)
This means, first, that for any σ ,
T  ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)), (26)
and, second, for any r ∈ T there is a J ∋ r such that, for any σ ,
J  ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φr(Z)). (27)
In the second part, choosing J to be T , we have an instance of the first part, so it suffices to prove the first only.
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Let τ be {⟨σi, J ∩ Ji⟩ | ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ and J  φ(σi)} ∪ {⟨xˆ, r⟩ | ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r and T  φr(xˆ)}. We claim that τ suffices:
T  ∀Z (Z ∈ τ ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)).
First, let ρ be a term. We need to show that T  ρ ∈ τ ↔ ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ). Unraveling the bi-implication and the
definition of forcing an implication, that becomes J  ρ ∈ τ iff J  ρ ∈ σ ∧φ(ρ), and J  ρr ∈ τ r iff J  ρr ∈ σ r ∧φr(ρr).
The first iff should be clear from the first part of the definition of τ and the second iff from the second part of the definition,
along with the observation that forcing φr(ρr) is independent of J .
We also need, for each r ∈ T , a J ∋ r such that for all ρ J  ρ ∈ τ r ↔ ρ ∈ σ r∧φr(ρ). Choosing J to be T and unraveling
as above (recycling the variable J) yields J  ρ ∈ τ r iff J  ρ ∈ σ r ∧ φr(ρ), and J  ρs ∈ τ r iff J  ρs ∈ σ r ∧ φr(ρs).
These hold because the only things that can be forced to be in τ r or σ r are (locally) images of ground model terms, and
the truth of φr evaluated at such a term is independent of J .
– Collection: Since only regular, not strong, Collection is true here, it would be easiest to hit this with a sledgehammer:
reflect V to some set M large enough to contain all the parameters and capture the truth of the assertion in question; the
term consisting of the whole universe according to Mwill be more than enough. It is more informative, though, to follow
through the natural construction of a bounding set, so we can highlight in the next section just what goes wrong with the
proof of Strong Collection.
We need
T  ∀x ∈ σ ∃y φ(x, y)→ ∃z ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ∈ z φ(x, y). (28)
It suffices to show that for any J
(J  ∀x ∈ σ ∃y φ(x, y))→ (J  ∃z ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ∈ z φ(x, y)), (29)
and the same relativized to r . The latter is a special case of the former, so it suffices to show just the former.
By hypothesis, for each ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ and r ∈ Ji ∩ J there are τir and Jir ⊆ Ji ∩ J , Jir ∋ r such that Jir  φ(σi, τir). Also,
for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ∋ r such that, for all ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r , Jr  ∃y φr(xˆ, y). For each s ∈ Jr , let τrxˆs and K ∋ s be such that
K  φr(xˆ, τrxˆs). By 2.9, part 5), K  φr(xˆ, τ srxˆs).
We claim that
τ = {⟨τir , Jir⟩ | i ∈ I, r ∈ Ji ∩ J} ∪ {⟨τ srxˆs, r⟩ | r ∈ J, ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r , s ∈ Jr} (30)
suffices: J  ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ∈ τ φ(x, y).
Forcing a universal has two parts. The first is that for all ρ,
J  ρ ∈ σ → ∃y ∈ τ φ(ρ, y). (31)
For the second, it suffices to show that for all r ∈ J and terms ρ
Jr  ρ ∈ σ r → ∃y ∈ τ r φr(ρ, y). (32)
For the former, first suppose J ⊇ K  ρ ∈ σ . It should be clear that the first part of τ covers this case. For the other
part of forcing that implication, for each r ∈ J , it suffices to show that Jr is as desired: for all K ⊆ Jr , if K  ρr ∈ σ r then
K  ∃y ∈ τ r φr(ρr , y). This is subsumed by the second implication from above, to which we now turn.
To show Jr  ρ ∈ σ r → ∃y ∈ τ r φr(ρ, y), we need to show first that if Jr ⊇ K  ρ ∈ σ r then K  ∃y ∈ τ r φr(ρ, y),
and second that for all s ∈ Jr there is a K ∋ s such that if K ⊃ L  ρs ∈ σ r then L  ∃y ∈ τ r φr(ρs, y). By choosing K to be
Jr , the second is subsumed by the first. For that, it should be clear that the second part of τ covers this case. In a bit more
detail, it suffices to work locally. (That is, it suffices to find a neighborhood of s ∈ K forcing what we want, by Lemma 2.9.)
Locally, ρ is forced equal to some xˆ, where ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r . As already shown, some neighborhood of s forces φr(xˆ, τ srxˆs), and⟨τ srxˆs, T ⟩ ∈ τ r by the second part of τ . 
3. Exponentiation, Separation, and Replacement
The secondmodel of [9] is the topological semantics of the current paper applied toR (with the standard topology). There
it was shown that the model satisfies not just the axioms proven here but also Exponentiation and Separation, and hence, in
the presence of Collection, Replacement too. The reason those extra properties hold in that case is that R is a ‘‘nice’’ space.
It is the purpose of this section to explore just what makes R nice and why such niceness is necessary for these additional
properties.
3.1. Exponentiation
We can identify exactly the property of T that would make Exponentiation hold.
Theorem 3.1. T  Exponentiation iff T is locally connected.
Proof. First we do the right-to-left direction. So suppose T is locally connected. Given terms σ and χ , let τ be {⟨ρ, J⟩ | J  ρ
is a function from σ to χ} ∪ {⟨xˆ, r⟩ | x is a function from σˇ r to χˇ r}. (τ can be arranged to be set-sized by requiring that ρ be
hereditarily empty outside of J .) It suffices to show that T  ∀z (z ∈ τ ↔ z is a function from σ to χ).
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The first clause in forcing ∀ is that, for any term ρ, T  ρ ∈ τ ↔ ρ is a function from σ to χ . That J  ρ ∈ τ iff J  ‘‘ρ is
a function from σ to χ ’’ is immediate from the first part of τ . As for J  ρr ∈ τ r iff J  ‘‘ρr is a function from σ r to χ r ’’, by
2.9, part 6), both of those statements are independent of J , and the iff holds because of the second part of τ .
The crux of the matter is the second clause in forcing ∀: J  ρ ∈ τ r iff J  ‘‘ρ is a function from σ r to χ r ’’. Why can only
ground model functions be forced (locally) to be functions? For s ∈ J , let Ks ⊆ J be a connected neighborhood of s. For each
⟨σi, T ⟩ ∈ σ r , pick a ⟨χi, T ⟩ ∈ χ such that the value of (i.e. the largest subset of Ks forcing) ‘‘ρ(σi) = χi’’ is non-empty. That
set, along with the value of ‘‘ρ(σi) ≠ χi’’, is a disjoint open cover of Ks. Since Ks is connected, the latter set is empty. So all
of the values of ρ are determined by Ks, so Ks forces ρ to equal a ground model term. Since J is covered by such sets, J also
forces ρ to be a ground model term.
Now for the converse, suppose T is not locally connected. Assuming that T still forces Exponentiation, we will come up
with a contradiction. Let x ∈ J ⊆ T be such that no neighborhood of x which is a subset of J is connected. Working within
J as a subspace of T , J is itself not connected, and so can be partitioned into two clopen subsets, K0 and J0 ∋ x. Inductively,
given x ∈ Jn clopen, partition Jn into clopen Kn+1 and Jn+1 ∋ x. Let O consist of all of the Jis. By Exponentiation, J is covered
by sets I forcing ‘‘ZI is the function space from Oˆ to 2ˆ’’. In particular, for each r ∈ J there is an Ir with r ∈ Ir ⊆ I such that,
for each σ , Ir  ‘‘σ ∈ Z rI ↔ σ is a function from Oˆ to 2ˆ’’. Notice that each Z rI consists only of ground model terms standing
for ground model functions, and each ground model function from O to 2 is forced by J to be such a function from Oˆ to 2ˆ, so
each Z rI equals Oˆ2. In short, for each σ , J  ‘‘σ ∈ Oˆ2 ↔ σ is a function from Oˆ to 2ˆ’’.
Now let f be the term such that Ji  f (Jˆi) = 1 and Ki  f (Jˆi) = 0.’’ J  ‘‘f is a function from Oˆ to 2ˆ,’’ so J  ‘‘f ∈ Oˆ2’’. Each
point in Jω := i Ji has a neighborhood, necessarily a subset of Jω , forcing f to be the constant function 1, so Jω is open. As
an intersection of closed sets, Jω is also closed, and contains x to boot. This construction can continue indefinitely: at stage
α+ 1, split the clopen Jα ∋ x into clopen Kα+1 and Jα+1 ∋ x; at stage λ a limit, consider the function space from {Jα | α < λ}
to 2. This is a contradiction, because it produces class-many subsets of J . 
An example of a non-locally connected space is a Cantor space. Forcingwith that produces a random0–1 sequence, which
is a function from N to 2. So the canonical generic is in a function space, but cannot be captured by any ground model set.
3.2. Separation
The situation here seems more difficult than for Exponentiation, because we have not yet been able to find a property
on T equivalent to Separation. Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any such nice property, as discussed at the end of
this sub-section. Nevertheless, we still have a theorem and some examples.
It is instructive to see why, in the proof of Separation in the main theorem, Full Separation did not hold, only Bounded.
The problem came with the settling. Given σ and ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r , we need to know whether to put xˆ into the subset τ of σ
defined by φ. We can certainly look for a neighborhood forcing φr(xˆ) or its negation. But when forcing a universal, we need
a fixed neighborhood Jr of r deciding each φr(xˆ) simultaneously, and cannot afford to use a separate Jrxˆ for each different xˆ.
Since all the parameters in that formula are ground model terms, it is not their meanings that could change over different
open sets, but rather only the topology itself and what it makes true and false. So the natural hypothesis to say that this
doesn’t happen is that, locally, all points look alike.
Definition 3.2. T is locally homogeneous around r, s ∈ T if there are neighborhoods Jr , Js of r and s respectively and a
homeomorphism of Jr to Js sending r to s.
An open set U is homogeneous if it is locally homogeneous around all r, s ∈ U .
T is locally homogeneous if every r ∈ T has a homogeneous neighborhood.
Lemma 3.3. If U is homogeneous, φ contains only ground model terms, and U ⊇ V  φ (V non-empty), then U  φ.
Proof. Let r ∈ V . For s ∈ U , let Vr and Vs be the neighborhoods f the homeomorphism given by the homogeneity of U . f (σ )
can be defined inductively on terms σ . (Briefly, hereditarily restrict σ to Vr and apply f to the second parts of the pairs in the
terms.) f (ψ) is thenψ with f applied to the parameters. It is easy to show inductively on formulas that Vr  ψ iff Vs  f (ψ).
If φ contains only ground model terms, then f (φ) = φ. So U is covered by open sets that force φ. Hence U  φ. 
Theorem 3.4. If T is locally homogeneous then T  FullSeparation.
Proof. As in the proof of Bounded Separation from the previous section, we have to show that, for any σ , T  ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈
Y ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧φ(Z)), only this timewith no restriction on φ. The choice of witness Y is slightly different. For each r let Kr ∋ r
be homogeneous. Let τ be {⟨σi, J ∩ Ji⟩ | ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ and J  φ(σi)} ∪ {⟨xˆ, r⟩ | ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r and Kr  φr(xˆ)}. The difference
from before is that in the latter part of τ membership is determined by what’s forced by Kr instead of by T . We claim that τ
suffices: T  ∀Z (Z ∈ τ ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)).
For the first clause in forcing ∀, let ρ be a term. We need to show T  ρ ∈ τ ↔ ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ). By the first clause in
forcing→, we have to show that for all J J  ρ ∈ τ iff J  ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ), which should be clear from the first part of τ .
For the second clause in→ it suffices to show that for all J ⊆ Kr J  ρr ∈ τ r iff J  ρr ∈ σ r ∧ φr(ρr). Regarding forcing
membership, all of the terms here are groundmodel terms, so membership is absolute (does not depend on the choice of J).
If ρr enters τ r because of the first part of τ ’s definition, then we have σ ri = ρr , r ∈ J  φ(σi), r ∈ Ji, and ⟨σi, Ji⟩ ∈ σ . By 2.9,
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part 5), some neighborhood Jr of r forces φr(σ ri ). By the lemma just above (applied to Kr ∩ Jr ), Kr forces the same. Hence we
can restrict our attention to terms ρr which enter τ because of τ ’s definition’s second part. Again by the preceding lemma,
for J non-empty, J  φr(ρr) iff Kr  φr(ρr), which suffices. (For J empty, J forces everything.)
For the second clause in forcing ∀, it suffices to show that Kr  ρ ∈ τ r ↔ ρ ∈ σ r ∧ φr(ρ). If any J ⊆ Kr forces
ρ ∈ τ r or ρ ∈ σ r , then locally ρ is forced to be some ground model term, and we’re in the same situation as in the previous
paragraph. 
We would like to see to what degree we can turn the previous theorem into an iff. Toward that end, suppose T is not
locally homogeneous. So we can choose r ∈ T which has no homogeneous neighborhood. That means every neighborhood
of r contains two points, say s and t , with no local homeomorphism sending s to t . If there were local homeomorphisms
from r to both s and t , they could be composed to get one from s to t . So one of s and t can be chosen to be r .
Example 1. It is possible that there is a fixed s that can be chosen as a witness to r ’s non-homogeneity from every
neighborhood of r . In particular, every open containing r also contains s. If every open set containing s also contained r ,
then the function interchanging r and s and leaving everything else alone would be a homeomorphism contradicting the
assumptions, so some neighborhood of s does not contain r . The smallest example of such a space is the two-element space
T = {r, s}, with opens T ,∅, and {s}. Let σ be {⟨0, r⟩}; that is, 0 gets into σ whenwe settle at r . Let φ be ∀x, y x ≠ y∨¬x ≠ y.
Suppose Z were {x ∈ σ | φ}:
T  ‘‘∀x x ∈ Z ↔ x ∈ σ ∧ φ’’. (33)
In particular, settling at r , we get
T  ‘‘∀x x ∈ Z r ↔ x = 0 ∧ φr ’’, (34)
or, more simply,
T  0 ∈ Z r ↔ φ. (35)
As Z r is a ground model term, T decides 0 ∈ Z r . But T does not decide φ: T does not force ‘‘σ ≠ 1∨¬σ ≠ 1’’, but {s} forces
φ, both of which can be calculated by cranking through the definitions. Hence T does not force Separation.
Example 2. An example of the opposite kind is where there is no s in every open neighborhood of r . Here let T be R≥0. Let
σ be {⟨0, 0⟩}. Let φ be
∀x ⊆ 1 ∃y ((0 ∈ x → y = 0 ∨ y = 1) ∧ (¬¬y = 0 ∨ ¬¬y = 1→ 0 ∈ x)). (36)
If Separation held, we could form {x ∈ σ | φ}. Settling at 0, we would have {0 | φ} as a ground model set. But φ is not
decided in any neighborhood of 0. That’s because R>0  φ, since y can be chosen to alternate between 0 and 1 on the
disjoint intervals that constitute the support of x. But on any neighborhood containing 0, instantiating x with {⟨0,R>0⟩}
forces any such y to be the constant 0 or 1 on the positives, hence not not equal to 0 or not not equal to 1, but does not force
x to be inhabited.
What these examples indicate is less that the failure of homogeneity leads to the failure of Separation, but rather that
what is needed in such a construction is the transferability of a property of the underlying topology into the internal language
of the set theory. More explicitly, all the proof of Separation needed was a Kr ∋ r , which may well depend on the choice
of φ and σ , such that, for all ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r , Kr  φr(xˆ) or Kr  ¬φr(xˆ). It is easy to see that the existence of r, φ, and
σ for which there is no such Kr immediately provides a counter-example to Separation. This is apparently less than the
homeomorphisms needed for local homogeneity. We find it unlikely that there would be a direct correspondence between
any natural topological property and this feature of the forcing, so closely tied to set theory and its language. In contrast,
there could well be such a topological property for a certain formula or class of formulas. It would be interesting to know to
what degree this is possible, and why, even when the answer is simply ‘‘not at all’’.
3.3. Replacement and Strong Collection
If Separation were to hold (in the presence of the other axioms from above), then Strong Collection would follow, which
itself implies Replacement. Hence a powerful way to show that Separation is not forced is to give an example in which
even Replacement fails. In the example below, the offending formula is a Boolean combination ofΣ1 formulas. This is about
as strong a result as one could hope for, as further restrictions on the formula render Replacement provable. Suppose, for
instance, the function were Σ1 definable: ∀x ∈ A ∃!y ∃z φ(x, y, z), where φ is ∆0. By Collection, there is a bounding sets
for triples ⟨x, y, z⟩ with φ(x, y, z), as x runs through A. By ∆0 Separation, we can restrict that bounding set to only triples
where the first component is in A and the triple satisfies φ. Then by ∆0 Separation again, we can project onto the second
coordinate. Perhaps there is still some wiggle room betweenΣ1 and Boolean combinations thereof, such as in the number
and use of implications (including negations), if one wanted to fine tune this result, but there’s certainly not a lot.
Example 3. Let Tn (n > 0) be the standard space for collapsingℵn to be countable: elements are injections fromℵ0 toℵn, an
open set is given by a finite partial function of the same type, an element is in that open set if it is compatible with the partial
function. Let T be the disjoint union of the Tns adjoined with an extra element∞:n Tn ∪ {∞}. A basis for the topology is
given by all the open subsets of each Tn, plus the basic open neighborhoods of∞, which are all of the formn≥N Tn ∪ {∞}
for some N .
R.S. Lubarsky / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 820–830 829
This T falsifies Replacement. To state the instance claimed to be falsified, we need several parameters. One is {⟨nˆ,∞⟩ |
n ∈ ω}, which we will call ω−. Another is the internalization of the function n → ℵn (n ∈ ω), which we will refer to via the
free use of the notation ℵˆn, even when n is just a variable. Finally, we will implicitly need ωˆ in the assertion ‘‘X is countable’’,
which is the abbreviation for what you think (i.e. the existence of a bijection with ωˆ). Note that ‘‘X is uncountable’’ is taken
as the negation of ‘‘X is countable’’.
Definition 3.5. Let φ(x, z) be the conjunction of:
1. z = 0 ∨ z = 1
2. z = 0↔ ℵˆx is uncountable
3. z = 1↔ ¬¬ℵˆx is countable.
Proposition 3.6. T ̸ ∀x ∈ ω− ∃!y φ(x, y) → ∃f ∀x ∈ ω−φ(x, f (x)).
Proof. First we show that T forces the antecedent ∀x(x ∈ ω− → ∃!y φ(x, y)).
For the first clause in forcing ∀, we need to show that for all σ T  σ ∈ ω− → ∃!y φ(σ , y). The first clause in forcing
that implication is vacuous, as no open set will force σ ∈ ω−. The second clause is vacuous for all choices of r except∞,
as then (ω−)r is empty. Finally, for r = ∞, it suffices to show that T  ∃!y [(y = 0 ∨ y = 1) ∧ (y = 0 ↔ ℵˆnˆ is
uncountable) ∧ (y = 1↔ ¬¬ℵˆnˆ is countable)]. The term which is 0 on0<i<n Tn and 1 on the rest of T suffices.
The second clause in forcing ∀ is similar.
Since T forces the antecedent of the conditional, it suffices to show that T does not force the consequent: T ̸ ∃f ∀x ∈
ω− φ(x, f (x)). If that were not the case, there would be a term (we will ambiguously refer to as f ) and a neighborhood J of
∞ such that J  ∀x ∈ ω− φ(x, f (x)). By Lemma 2.9, part 5), there would be a K ∋ ∞ such that K  ∀x ∈ ωˆ φ(x, f∞(x)). K,
being open, contains a set of the form

n≥N Tn. LetM be N + 1. So K  φ(Mˆ, (f∞(Mˆ)). But f∞(Mˆ) is a ground model term,
and so is (forced by K to be) equal to 0ˆ or 1ˆ. Hence either K  ℵˆMˆ is uncountable or K  ¬¬ℵˆMˆ is countable. But neither is
the case, since K ⊇ TN  ℵˆMˆ is uncountable and K ⊇

n>N Tn  ℵˆMˆ is countable. 
Since the preceding is an example where Separation fails, by the results of the previous sub-section, local homogeneity
must fail too. Arguably, though, that’s not the essence of the construction. In this case, what determined the choice of ywas
a different open set for each x. No given neighborhood of∞ sufficed, because it would have been split for some x into a
sub-neighborhood forcing 0 and another forcing 1. So it seems to be a matter of connectedness.
Theorem 3.7. If T is locally connected then T  Replacement.
Proof. Sketch of proof:When showing the existence of a good bounding set (cf. the proof of Collection in themain theorem),
work in a connected neighborhood Jr of any given point r . For every J  σi ∈ σ ∧φ(σi, τi), include ⟨τi, J ∩ Jr⟩ in the bounding
set τ . As for the settling, for any ⟨xˆ, T ⟩ ∈ σ r , by the totality of φ, Jr is covered by sets K forcing φ(xˆ, τK ), for some choice
of τK . By settling, τK can be taken to be ground model terms yˆK . By uniqueness, the yˆK s have to agree wherever the Ks
overlap. Since they’re ground model terms, they don’t vary, so are the same ground model terms on all Ks that overlap. By
the connectedness of Jr , all the yˆK s are equal, say yˆ. Include ⟨yˆ, r⟩ in τ . 
Analogously with Separation, we do not believe that there is an equivalence between local connectedness and
Replacement. Rather, it’s likely that what’s at stake is some kind of definitional connectedness, whether an open set can
be split into disjoint clopens that are the truth values of different statements. It would be nice to see a nice topological
equivalent of that property or any interesting fragment of it.
Finally, it would be of interest to see any examples or theorems along these lines pertaining to Strong Collection that
cannot be reduced to ones about Replacement or Separation.
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